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CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS AND ABSTRACTS
ILLINOIS DOUBLE JEOPARDY ACT: AN EMPTY GESTURE
ROY W. SEARS
Double jeopardy arises from a second prosecu-
tion for one criminal act by one authority (single
sovereignty double jeopardy), or a second prosecu-
tion by an authority other than the one that first
prosecuted (dual sovereignty double jeopardy). A
second prosecution for the same offense by the
federal government is prohibited by the fifth
amendment of the federal constitution.' Such a sec-
ond prosecution is also prohibited by the constitu-
tions of forty-five states; and in the five states
where no constitutional bar exists, there is a com-
mon law rule to the same effect.
2
In dual sovereignty situations, the constitutional
bars do not apply, for "A single act which violates
both federal and state criminal laws is generally
held to result in a distinct offense against the two
separate governments.. . and may be punished by
both."'3 Thus, "In the absence of a statute, the rule
against double jeopardy applies only to offenses
against the same sovereignty.
4
A majority of the states recognize the rule that
an accused may be tried twice for the same crimi-
nal act by two separate sovereignties; 5 but in seven-
teen states, a state prosecution is barred by statute
if there was a prior federal prosecution for the same
crime.6 With the passage of a new statute, Illinois
I U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2 See Barktus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 154, n.9
(1958), (Justice Black, dissenting). See also: ALASKA
CONST. art. I, §9; HAWAII CONsT. art. I, §8.
3 People ex rd. Liss v. Supt. of Women's Prison,
282 N.Y. 115, 118, 25 N.E.2d 869, 871 (1940). See
also: Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959);
Barktus v. Illinois, note 2 supra.
4 People v. Eklof, 179 Misc. 536, 537, 41 N.Y.S.2d
557, 558 (1942). The federal offense was for taking
goods, in the flow of interstate commerce, with the
intent to convert them to one's own use. The state
charge was for bringing stolen property into the state:
i.e., the same goods, the same act.
5 State v. Gendron, 80 N.H. 394, 118 At. 814 (1922);
State v. Garcia, 198 Iowa 744, 200 N.W. 201 (1924);
Annot., 48 A.L.R. 1107 (1927).
These statutes are in addition to any prohibitions
in the constitutions or common law of the states:
ARz. REv. STAT. ANN. §13-146 (1956); CAL. PEN.
CODE §656; InAo CODE ANN. §19-315 (1948); IND.
AuN. STAT. §9-215 (1956); MnIN. STAT. §610-23
(1947); Miss. CODE ANN. §2432 (1957); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. §94-4703 (1949); NEv. REv. STAT. §171-
070 (1955); N.Y. PEN. LAWS §33; N.Y. CODE CRm.
PROC. §139; N.D. REv. CODE: §§12-0505, 29-0313
(1943); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §25 (1958); ORE. REv.
STAT. §131.240 (1957); S.D. CODE §§13.0506, 34.0813
(1939); TEX. CODE CRI. PROC. art. 208 (1926);
has become the eighteenth state to join these
ranks. The Illinois statute provides:
"Whenever on the trial of an accused per-
son for the violation of any criminal law of
this State it is shown that he has previously
been tried and convicted or acquitted under the
laws of the Federal government, which former
trial was based on the act or omission for which
he is being tried in this State, it is a sufficient de-
Jense."7 (Emphasis added.)
The Illinois statute allows the bar to be raised
only for previous acquittals or convictions by the
federal government, thereby eliminating from dis-
cussion previous trials by another state.8 This
statute also would not affect a subsequent federal
prosecution.9
The words of the Illinois statute, in themselves,
do not indicate how effective it will be in barring
an Illinois prosecution subsequent to a federal
prosecution for the same offense. The probable
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-1-25 (1953); VA. CODE ANN.
§19-232 (1950); WASH. REv. CODE §10.43.040 (1951);
Wis. STAT. ANN. §939.71 (1957). While there are some
federal statutes barring a second prosecution by the
federal government after a state trial for the same
offense, they are limited to the specific offense covered
by the federal statute. E.g., 18 U.S.C. §659 (1958).
This section of the Federal code prohibits the taking
of goods that are in interstate commerce but allows
"[A] judgment of conviction or acquittal on the merits
under the laws of any State.... ." to bar a prosecution
under the federal statute for the same act or acts.
7 ILL. REv. STAT. Ch. 38, §601.1 (1959).
8 Senate Bill 855 and House Bill 1149 were amended
by the Senate of the Illinois legislature to delete the
provision allowing the prior prosecution of another
state to bar a subsequent prosecution in Illinois. The
house bill which sets the prior federal prosecution as a
defense was approved on July 22, 1959, while the senate
bill, which prohibited any prosecution after a prior
federal trial, was vetoed July 24, 1959.
9 The new Illinois statute is only one step in the
direction of protecting an individual from double
jeopardy in dual sovereignty situations. The Illinois
statute could not, nor could any state act, preclude a
federal action after a state action. Chief Justice Taft
addressed himself to this point in United States v.
Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 385 (1922): "If the Congress sees
fit to bar prosecution by the federal courts for any act
when punishment for violation of state prohibition
has been imposed, it can of course, do so by proper
legislation." Until such time as Congress acts, we have
only the reassuring statement of the Attorney-General
that no federal prosecutions will be undertaken without
the permission of his office. (New York Times, April
6, 1959, p. 19. Note that Barktus v. Illinois, note 24
infra, was decided (after re-argument) on March 30,
1959.)
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answer can best be founded on an examination of
the interpretations placed on the double jeopardy
statutes of other states.
When raising the statutory defense of double
jeopardy one must consider what is required to
raise the bar and when the bar can be raised. The
Illinois statute requires that the defendant be
previously "tried and acquitted or convicted" by
the federal government.10 Thus it is unlikely that
Illinois will allow less than a previous federal con-
viction or acquittal to raise the bar. It is also pos-
sible that the Illinois courts will only find such
prior federal convictions or acquittals a bar when
the federal government was first to acquire juris-
diction over the offender." Thus in the situation
where an accused had been indicted by the state
before his prosecution by the federal government 2
the bar could not be claimed as distinguished from
the situation where the accused had merely been
taken into custody by the state and turned over to
the federal government for the first trial.13
The second consideration is when, as a matter of
procedure, the statutory defense may be invoked.
The Illinois statute provides that the prior convic-
tion or acquital "shall be a sufficient defense"; but
does this mean that the bar may be invoked by
pre-trial motion to quash or dismiss, or as a defense
immediately after jeopardy has attached, or as
part of the case for the defense?
New York has two statutory bars 4 -one which
10 See note 7 supra.
It Perry v. Harper, 307 P.2d 168 (Okla. Crim. 1957).
The state arrested and indicted a service man and
released him on bond. While on bond he was tried by
courts-martial and acquitted. The state on the basis
of prior jurisdiction allowed their indictment to go
to trial.
12 Ji.
13 State v. Mills, 163 P.2d 558 (Okla. Crim. 1945).
The defendant, an army officer, was taken into custody
by the state but later turned over to the military
authorities. After his acquittal at the courts-martial
the state proceeded against him. His motions to quash
and dismiss were sustained by the state court because
of their statute.
1
4N.Y. PEN. LAws §33. "Whenever it appears
upon the trial of an indictment that the offense was
committed in another state or country, or under such
circumstances that the courts of this state or govern-
ment had jurisdiction thereof, and that the defendant
has already been acquitted or convicted on the merits
upon a criminal prosecution under the laws of such
state, or country, founded upon the act or omission in
respect to which he is upon trial, such former acquittal
or conviction is a sufficient defense."
N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. §139. "When an act charged
as a crime is within the jurisdiction of another state,
territory or country, as well as within the jurisdiction
of this state, a'conviction or acquittal thereof in the
former, is a bar to a prosecution or indictment therefor
in this state."
is a defense on the trial of the indictment, and one
which prohibits prosecution. Interpreting its de-
fense type statute in the case of People v. Parker,5
the New York trial court, upon first hearing the
defendant's motion to quash the indictment on the
basis of the statutory bar, suggested that the de-
fense type statute could only be raised upon the
trial of the indictment. At a later hearing 6 the
court allowed the preliminary motion to dismiss
the basis of the prohibition type statute. In Okla-
homa the court allowed a preliminary motion to
dismiss 7 on the basis of the Oklahoma statute,
8
which is of the defense type. Although the Illinois
court has precedent for either choice, it would seem
that in pursuit of judicial efficiency, they would
allow the statutory defense to be raised on prelim-
inary motion.
To raise the statutory bar of double jeopardy,
the defendant generally must show that the state
prosecution is founded on the "same" charge or
act or ommission for which the defendant had
previously been tried in the federal courts. Both
single and dual sovereignty cases present great
difficulty to the state courts when they attempt to
determine whether one charge can be considered
the "same" as another for the purpose of raising
the double jeopardy bar. In single sovereignty
cases, the "same offense" test is sometimes used to
mean that if one new fact were stated in the second
indictment so as to change the charge, then the sec-
ond trial could stand' 9 Theoretically, part of the
difficulty could be eliminated if the courts inter-
pret the statutes as requiring that no trial be based
upon the same "act or omission" for which the
defendant had been tried, as opposed to the "same
offense" test. Under the Illinois statute, dearly
15 People v. Parker, 174 Misc. 49, 19 N.Y.S.2d
1007 (Kings County Court 1940).
1
6 People v. Parker, 175 Misc. 776, 25 N.Y.S.2d 247
(Kings County Court 1941). This case was decided
under section 139 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
which allowed the accused to invoke the protection
before the attachment of jeopardy and have the in-
dictment dismissed.
17 State v. Mills, note 13 supra.
s Oxr.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §25 (1958). "Whenever
it appears upon the trial that the accused has already
been acquitted or convicted upon any criminal prosecu-
tion under the laws of another State, government or
country, founded, upon the act or omission in respect
to which he is upon trial, this is a sufficient defense."
19 State v. Thompson, 241 Minn. 59, 62 N.W. 2d
512 (1954). After defendant had once been acquitted
on a charge of having received stolen funds, he was
indicted a second time under another section of the
same statute and tried on a charge of having received
the same sum of money and of having misappropriated
it to his own use.
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worded to include the "act or omission" test, the
court will find it difficult to construe the statute
otherwise. Therefore, the statute does attempt to
preclude the application of the "same offense" test,
as used in single sovereignty double jeopardy cases,
to any dual sovereignty, douible jeopardy cases.
20
If it is assumed that the purpose of the passage
of the Illinois statute was to prevent a recurrence
of a state prosecution after a completed federal ac-
tion,21 an analysis of the California case of People
v. Candeleria'- will be helpful in predicting the ful-
fillment of that purpose. Actually, there were
three Candeleria cases; the first was a federal trial
resulting in conviction of Candeleria for the
robbery of a federally insured bank." The federal
judge commuted the prisoner's sentence to sixty
days. After release from the federal prison, Can-
deleria was arrested and tried by the state for
robbery of the same bank.24 The state court said, "if
the federal conviction was 'founded upon' that act,
then the fact that there was such a pievious con-
viction is a sufficient defense to the state charge."' 25
The court then held that the charge was "founded
upon the act" and the plea of double jeopardy,
20 See note 40 infra. The Illinois statute carefully
avoids the use of the word "offense" and refers to the
criminal law of the state and the law of the federal
government. This could be indicative of the legislative
intent to avoid confusion in interpreting the word"offense" or of their displeasure with the results reached
under the "same offense" test.
21 The Illinois legislature passed this act shortly
after the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Barktus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959), upholding the
decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in People v.
Barktus, 7 Ill. 2d 138, 130 N.E. 2d 187 (1955), to the
effect that the defendant's acquittal in federal court
of the charge of robbing a federally insured bank did
not bar prosecution of the defendant in the state courts
for the same robbery of the same bank.
2People v. Candeleria, 139 Cal. App. 2d 432, 294
P.2d 120 (1956).
"United States v. Candeleria, 131 F. Supp. 797
(S.D. Cal. 1955). The federal trial was for armed
robbery of a federally insured bank. Candeleria was
sentenced to a federal prison and the state enforcement
agency placed a detamer on the prisoner which had
the effect of cutting off any of the rehabilitation possi-
bilities that the federal court had envisioned. The case
came back for modification of sentence on the motion
of the sentencing judge.
21 People v. Candeleria, note 25 infra.
2Pepev. Candeleria, 139 Cal. App. 2d 432,440,
294 P.2d 120 (1956). In the state prosecution for rob-
bery, it was found that the prior federal prosecution
involved only one other element, the fact that the
bank was federally insured. This was said to be a
jurisdictional element and did not pertain to any act
on the part of the defendant in committing the robbery.
"All the acts constituting the state offense were in-
cluded in the federal offense and were necessary to
constitute the federal offense."
based on the statute,0 was a sufficient defense. In
the third case, 7 the state prosecuted Candeleria
for burglary, and it was found that the defendant's
entering with intent to commit robbery was not
the same act as robbery; hence, the defendant was
convicted of burglary.
A comparison of the California code with the
Illinois statute will show very little difference in
wording or logic." Thus, where before the statute
was passed, Illinois could prosecute a person for
robbery after the federal government had prose-
cuted him for robbery of the same federally in-
sured bank," after the passage of the statute, the
state would have to change the charge in the indict-
ment to read burglary, as the California prosecutor
was forced to do in the third Candeleria case.
Decisions under the New York double jeopardy
statutes"0 are also exemplary of the varied inter-
pretations the courts give these statutes. In 1926,
in the case of People v. Arenstein, 1 the New York
court held that a conviction in the District of
Columbia for "conspiracy to bring stolen certifi-
cates of stock into the District of Columbia" was
not a bar to a trial and conviction in the New York
courts on the charge of "criminally receiving stolen
property"-i.e., the same stock certificates. To
reach this end, the court reasoned that the legis-
lative intent was to assure the defendant freedom
from second prosecution only when he could show
the second offense was "the particular offense of
which he was convicted or acquitted, on the merits,
26 CA. PEN. CODE §656. "Whenever on the trial of
an accused person it appears that upon a criminal
prosecution under the laws of another state, govern-
ment or country, founded upon the act or omission in
respect to which he is on trial he has been acquitted or
convicted, it is a sufficient defense."
27 People v. Candeleria, 139 Cal. App. 2d 879, 315
P.2d 386 (1957). The prosecution for different offenses,
composed of the different acts, did not give rise to
double jeopardy.
"I See, California statute cited note 26 supra; and
Illinois statute in text at note 7 supra. Both statutes
allow a former prosecution to be a defense and neither
makes use of the word "offense".
"1See note 21 supra.
10 Statutes cited note 14 supra.
"1 128 Misc. 176, 182, 218 N.Y. Supp. 633 (Ct. of
Gen'l Sessions 1926). The New York statute originally
read: "But whenever it appears upon.the trial of an
indictment that the accused has already been acquitted
or convicted upon any criminal prosecution under the
laws of another state, government, or country, founded
upon the act or omission in respect to which he is on
trial, this is a sufficient defense." This statute was
amended to the present Section 33 of the Penal Law
cited note 14 supra. The court held that the changes
indicate that the intent of the legislature was to make
the defense available in a more narrow scope; hence,
the statute was inapplicable.
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in another state or country, and that such offense
was founded upon the act charged in the indict-
ment filed against him in New York."32 Thus, in
1929, the New York court was very strict and re-
quired the accused to pass both the "act" and
"offense" tests to be protected by the statutory
bar.
The strict view in New York was altered slightly
in 1933 in the case of People v. Spitzer, where
the court held that when facts of a conviction,
under the first indictment, would support a con-
viction under the second, the first conviction is a
bar to the second. The test here (although the
court named many) actually came to be that
where there are no new facts to differentiate the
second indictment from the first conviction, the
statute is a complete bar or defense. There seems
to be an implication that if one new fact was neces-
sary or available, the bar would not have been
raised.
A New York court, in 1940, shifted to an even
more liberal view in the case of People v. Parker,4
by extending the doctrine of the Spitzer case to
the limit of its logic. The federal government
charged Parker with a conspiracy to transport in
inter-state commerce a kidnapped person. Subse-
quent to his conviction in the federal court, New
York charged Parker with kidnapping. To the
statutory defense of double jeopardy, the prosecu-
tion contended that although the facts proved in
the federal conviction were similar to those in the
state indictment, they were not identical. Only an
identity of facts, the prosecution contended, would
allow the statutory bar to be raised. In holding the
suggested construction too narrow, the judge
stated:
"It appeals to me as a more reasonable con-
struction that if it be imperative that an essen-
tial fact be established to secure a conviction
under both statutes, it is sufficient to raise the
bar."35
In 1942, however, a New York court recognized
that the state barring statute would stop a case
of dual sovereignty double jeopardy, when the
state constitution would not; however, the court
went on to apply the test of "same in law and
Id. at 182.
148 Misc. 97, 266 N. Y. Supp. 522 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
The court in applying the test of whether the offenses
were the same in fact and law, found that the facts
were the same and the law could not be separated from
the facts in as much as one was used to prove the other.
34 People v. Parker, note 16 supra.
15 Id. at 781.
fact." ' Essentially, this is the same as the test in
the Spitzer case, and when it was found that the
same proof would convict under both indictments;
the court quashed the second indictment. Thus,
while recognizing the narrow scope of the constitu-
tional law'of the state, the court retreated a step
from the Parker case and accepted the Spitzer
doctrine, requiring more than mere duplication of
one essential fact on the part of the state to raise
the bar.
Two later cases, People v. Adamchesky 7 and
People v. Mignogna,35 have further developed
methods of circumventing the statutes. In these
cases, where the indictment for the federal offense
had charged one crime, such as larceny, the later
state indictment would charge burglary. The court
could then apply either the test of the same
offense or the test which allows the state to pro-
ceed if it can prove one new fact; and, as a result,
the convictions were upheld.
From these New York cases, we can see that
there are several possible interpretations that the
Illinois court can accept.P Even if the Illinois
court takes at face value the words in the Illinois
statute and applies the test based on the same act
or omission, the second indictment can be worded
so that the second prosecution can be brought for
the act of taking when the first conviction was for
the act of breaking. Or, the court could require
that all facts needed to prove the "act" be the
38 People v. Eklof, note 4 supra.
87 People v. Adamchesky, 184 Misc. 769, 55 N.Y.S.
2d 90 (Ct. of Gen'l Sess. 1945). Although the driver
was a thief there was no necessity for the federal gov-
ernment to offer evidence of this fact. There was only
necessity for showing that the driver had knowledge
of the nature of the goods: i.e.-stolen.
38 People v. Miknogna, 54 N.Y.S.2d 233 (Queens
County Ct. 1945), Aff'd. People v. Mangano, 269
App. Div. 954, 57 N.Y.S.2d 891 (1945). The defend-
ant (a man with many aliases) b'roke into an office
and stole federal gas ration stamps. The federal gov-
ernment convicted him for larceny and the state
government convicted him for the breaking and
entering.
9 The Oklahoma barring statute, which is similar to
that of Illinois, has been interpreted in a manner essen-
tially similar to the New York act. The Oklahoma cases
however seem to run to more narrow interpretations.
The statutory defense was allowed "by virtue of the
statute alone" when the second prosecution was based
on the "same act or omission". LaForge v. State, 28
Okla. Crim. 37, 228 Pac. 1111 (1924). Indictments
charging different offenses but proved by facts co-
operatively gathered were allowed to stand in Rambo
v. State, 38 Okla. Crim. 192, 259 Pac. 602 (1927). The
fact that the indictments were differently worded and
differently proved was the ambiguous ground for hold-
ing no double jeopardy in Hazelwo'd v. State, 42 Okla.
Crim. 38, 273 Pac. 1017 (1929).
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